How Israel Plans to Defeat Hamas in Gaza

As the ground war in Gaza begins, the contours of the plan to defeat Hamas are emerging. The strategy of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) focuses on isolating Gaza City and the northern region of the coastal strip, a deliberate approach influenced by U.S. pressure on Israel to limit civilian casualties and Israel’s recognition of the complexities associated with a full-scale ground incursion against a well-entrenched defense. The coming weeks will therefore likely focus on encirclement and attrition, rather than the block-by-block assault U.S. forces chose as their method of attack during the first and second battles of Fallujah in 2004.

The IDF concept reflects the nature of the kind of fighting required in Gaza: urban warfare in packed-in conditions against an underground force. This overview of IDF strategy was based on interviews with three high-ranking sources in the IDF who requested anonymity because they were not authorized to speak about operations. The Israeli strategy appears sequential and intricate, involving raids, intelligence gathering, and holding cleared pockets. From these pockets, IDF troops plan to strike at Hamas leaders and then withdraw back to the cleared areas to request air support. If it succeeds as planned, this process will allow a slow building-out of pockets removed from Hamas control.

It will take time: The senior IDF officers I spoke with believe the ground war in Gaza City will stretch for many months. The cycle of locating, isolating, constricting, and then eliminating Hamas commanders will grind on slowly. The IDF will chip away at the top tier of the militant group. Meanwhile, these limited strikes will also reduce Hamas’s capacity to manufacture and deploy missiles, rockets, and armed drones. Though more time-consuming than the approach used by the IDF during Operation Protective Edge, the 50-day series of direct assaults on entrenched positions and tunnel networks in July and August 2014, this approach introduces far less risk—to both IDF troops and Palestinian civilians. The 2014 operation, initiated in response to a relentless barrage of missiles, rockets, and mortars aimed at civilian areas in Israel, began with an intense IDF aerial bombardment during the first week. Having failed to deter Hamas, it was followed by a comprehensive ground offensive in the Gaza Strip. Now, Israel seeks regime change rather than deterrence. The current approach will take much longer.

Inside the vast Hamas tunnel networks, the IDF’s Yahalom Unit, a specialized engineering force, will conduct targeted raids to gather enhanced intelligence. This intelligence will pinpoint Hamas’s leadership and command centers. The information and intelligence collected will build on itself: One piece of intelligence leads to a raid, which produces more intelligence and more attacks. At least, that’s the aspiration. All the while, the IDF expects Hamas’s losses to pile up and its leadership to be weakened in a sustained pressure campaign.

The IDF leaders I spoke with say they aim to kill as many of Hamas’s leaders as possible without fully investing in dangerous underground fighting. The IDF’s solution to Hamas’s extensive tunnel network is to develop enough intelligence to target the generators and ventilator systems, choking out the tunnels. While the IDF is trained for both urban and subterranean warfare, using a large ground force to enter either the city or the tunnels would inherently put them and the hostages held there at a disadvantage. As part of this strategy, Israel halted fuel shipments into Gaza. The IDF knows Hamas appropriates fuel for generators to operate the tunnel network. The blockage of fuel also chokes out civilians: Hospitals in Gaza are desperately low on energy to run emergency generators crucial for powering incubators and other vital medical machinery.

There are additional trade-offs. Because the IDF does not intend to put large numbers of troops in the city, it has no practical way to prevent Hamas leaders from slipping away to the south. Furthermore, leaving the tunnel systems largely intact may allow parts of Hamas to live on underground beyond the current fighting. A remnant of Hamas surviving the war is at odds with public vows by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant to completely destroy the militant group.

Netanyahu has made several attempts to assure Israelis that the IDF can simultaneously kill Hamas leaders and secure the release of more than 200 hostages taken from Israel. The theory is that the IDF can put enough pressure on Hamas to force the release of hostages. Israeli forces are adopting a deliberate pace in their ground offensive in Gaza, partly to create an opportunity for negotiations with Hamas militants for the release of their captives.

The IDF leadership understands that engaging in combat within densely populated urban areas and venturing underground will strip the Israeli military of most of its technological advantages, including advanced surveillance systems, sensors, and communications equipment. That would offer Hamas an edge both above and below ground.

Tunnel battles are among the most difficult for armies in the offense to wage. Every aspect favors the defense. A determined enemy entrenched within a tunnel or cave system gains the upper hand, dictating the battle’s commencement and often its outcome, given the abundance of opportunities for ambush. The tunnels will introduce an element of disorientation and surrealism, creating blind spots as Hamas gunmen seemingly materialize out of thin air to launch attacks. The fate of this underground struggle will undoubtedly play a pivotal role in shaping the outcome of this critical phase of the conflict.

While the IDF is sure to defeat Hamas militarily, Israel’s ability to manage a post-conflict power vacuum is less certain. Israel withdrew troops from Gaza in 2005 after 38 years of occupation and does not want responsibility for governing the territory after the fall of Hamas. However, once Hamas is out, Iran will likely look to insert a more radical structure to keep Israel bogged down. Once the ground war is over, Israel must permanently solve the problem.

The IDF, in concert with the U.S. Defense Department, appears to be favoring a plan it refers to as “The Day After Hamas.” The idea, detailed to me by a senior IDF leader, involves determining a mechanism to facilitate temporary governance through an international coalition until a sufficiently stable Palestinian government can be established. As of now, the plan seems to be hazy—not least because a postwar transition is not something for Israeli military leaders to decide on their own. Such a transition plan will require political leadership, diplomatic efforts, buy-in from the Palestinian Authority, and cooperation with other governments in the region.

Until then, the IDF’s military strategy in Gaza, as described by the officers I spoke with, represents a nuanced and deliberate approach to a complex conflict taking place both beneath and above the ground. By prioritizing precision, intelligence, and a measured pace, the IDF is navigating urban and tunnel warfare with a clear understanding of the risks and rewards. As the ground war unfolds, the world watches closely, bearing witness to a military campaign that seeks not only to defeat an adversary but to lay the groundwork for a more stable and secure future. The months ahead will determine that outcome—dependent not least on how the world views Israel on the day after Hamas.