

● PSF SAFE FILE: John G. Winant

Prex

PSF Safe: Winant file

1224-2
52-1

EH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (30)

London
Dated April 3, 1941
Rec'd 6:17 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Having now been here a month, I wanted to send you
a few brief memoranda which might be helpful.

One. MILITARY MATTERS.

A certain naval person has spent a great deal of
time in trying to familiarize Averill and myself with
the naval situation. A day never passes without my
wishing that you personally might see the map rooms
and charts and get the major naval strategy which I
feel can only be thoroughly understood by a man who
has spent a lifetime in this complicated field of modern
warfare. Without wanting to recommend anyone in par-
ticular and with very real respect for Captain Lockwood,
the Naval Attache, and his assistants, I have felt that
if Admiral Stark could not be spared, you might want to
send someone like Admiral Pratt, who I understand is
working with you, over here for a brief period in order

to

EH -2- 1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from London.

to bring you first hand the total picture of high naval policy as it has been developed so far in this war. I am certain that the Prime Minister and all others concerned would gladly give such a man, known to be in immediate personal contact with you, the whole story. Since we are not at war there is some hesitation in turning over to the military attaches day by day the complete operational information on a routine reporting basis. The Prime Minister reminded me Sunday in limiting the detailing of certain information asked for by your air attaches that only a handful of men in his own government are familiar with complete over-all strategy. Our air service men are now given summary information covering short periods of time and information on particular situations for which they specifically ask.

I am sure you will be interested to talk to Major General Maloney, who not only did a thoroughly first rate job as a member of the Base Lease Commission, but who took advantage of his free time here to familiarize himself with the work of the British Army Staff. He had their respect and complete confidence. I sent over by him a detailed report on certain air needs and recommendations in the preparation of which both the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Aircraft Production collaborated. I requested that this report go to the Secretaries of War and Navy and to Harry.

WINANT

DES

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

LONDON

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 6:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Two. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS.

After the Lend-Lease Bill had been passed the question of taking over the British commitments in America with particular emphasis on the resulting credit balances available to the British Treasury was taken up with me by both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I reported these conversations in my cable no. 1060, March 18, 8 p.m. forwarded to you and the Secretary of the Treasury which included a letter of Under Secretary Waley addressed to Ben Cohen summarizing the situation from the British point of view. I merely reported the deep concern expressed here without recommendations, and the matter has not since been brought up by either the Prime Minister or the Chancellor. The problem, however, will probably recur as you cannot live here and not be aware of the growing reduction of national income due to a contraction of normal business, the transfer of the energies of the people to war production and

-2- 1309, April 3, 1941, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from London

and war services and the decline in the export trade. War strategy has been so closely related in these last few weeks to allied situations in the Balkans and elsewhere that some flexibility of action in the field of foreign exchange was necessary. It occurred to me that such situations will repeat themselves and other special British situations will arise in which it might be simpler as well as of advantage for a country at war to be able to meet financial contingencies rapidly and from its own coffers. In the present circumstances shortage of funds might not only weaken England as a first line of defense but be a sufficient threat to prompt us to find the money to meet a special situation that would be hard to explain to Congress in the time which the emergency allowed and might be particularly embarrassing to handle without Congressional action with the Johnson Act on the statute book. I just do not want you to have to face that sort of headache. These, I realize, are properly Treasury matters and we are handicapped for the moment by the absence of anyone who is kept currently informed of the financial conversations at Washington. I understand from a Department cable that this situation is being given attention.

WINANT

NPL

EH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

London

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 8:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Keynes who is associated with the Treasury made the point to me that he thought the situation was clouded at the end of the last war because it appeared that England had used our credits for other than war materials purchased in America. For that reason he thought it would be much better all around if we should confine the Lease-Lend Bill rather strictly to war materials but would be sufficiently generous in taking care of such materials so as to make it possible for Britain to meet other obligations on her own responsibility.

There is another subject akin to this. It affects directly the use of British manpower and indirectly our own financial policy. I am told in spite of curtailment in British exports there are probably not far short of 1,000,000 persons engaged in the export trade and even a considerable number of these are still engaged in the engineering

EH -2- 1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from London.

engineering and metal trades. This bears directly on the dollar exchange situation and the maintenance of England's trade relations. Incidentally, the continuance of this trade even in its reduced volume slows up the turn-around of ships although it involves no displacement of war cargoes. As England has extended her Near Eastern operations it has become more obvious that the effective use of her manpower is one of Britain's paramount needs and that of course in turn affects our own policy. As Beveridge put it when I talked with him the English strength in manpower is 75,000,000 with the support of 130,000,000 from the States while there are 80,000,000 Germans, 40,000,000 Italians and the supporting output of some 200,000,000 allied or subjected people.

WINANT

NPL

DES

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LONDON

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 6:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

I think few people realize the extent to which modern warfare absorbs men in the supporting services. I heard Churchill say that excluding the factory it took 70 men on the ground to support a plane in the air. This came out in a discussion between Churchill and Beaverbrook in which the former was questioning the need of so high a ratio. Collateral services in air warfare are considerably more than they used to be. For example some 40,000 people are employed in the ground-signalling, the radio direction-finder services, and collateral observer corps. The British Air Force numbers approximately 500,000 men.

WINANT

NPL

EH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

London

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 9:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

Three. Social matters. When you first spoke to me about the Ambassadorship you told me there were certain phenomena which you wanted to know and which were seldom reported to you. Except for two week ends with the Prime Minister and one with Beaverbrook, I have not been able yet to get out of London. Therefore some of the things I am reporting I have not got first hand. There are two things which have impressed me most: the first, the effort to maintain the appearance of normal life in the face of danger, and second, the patient acceptance of hardships and hazards by ordinary people. When I spoke the other day at a combined meeting of employers' and workers' representatives, I suggested that resistance required "not only skill and hard work and materials in combination with the iron will of a soldier, but an understanding that is sensitive to the devoted

EH -2- 1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from London.

devoted loyalty of the people, and the determination to defend them in the efficiency of their giving." I hope that in allotting food you will encourage the maintenance of existing surpluses and perhaps the checking of minimum standards required for social efficiency.

WINANT

EMB

EH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)

London

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 10:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION SIX).

You wanted to know the effects of bombing. At Clydeside a week or so ago 1100 persons were killed 1600 seriously injured and a very large number of homes destroyed. I was told by competent witnesses that while the families waited to be taken to what shelters were available they rested on what little they had been able to save of their belongings, silent and unswayed, "without a tear in the lot." An apprentices' strike which was going on there was called off. Individual output increased in the region.

The effect of bombing on factories varies in different communities. Where there is courageous leadership by the mayor, the management or among the workers there has been a prompt return to work. (?) such leadership was absent the problem has been (?) particularly in night (?)

The

EH -2- 1309, April 3, 9 p.m, (SECTION SIX) from London.

The Germans are beginning to use heavier bombs. I saw photographs of the destruction in a workers' dwelling area caused by a 4,000 pound German bomb. 400 people were killed and 400 houses destroyed.

WINANT

NPL

EH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

London

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 8:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN).

The Director of Air Arms Development and a wing commander who was on the flight described to me the destruction in Emden caused by the dropping of the first English 4,000 pound bombs. It blew debris up to 1000 feet, doing damage over a wide area. In the experimental period it shok windows 16 miles away. It makes a crater of only four and a half feet. The bomb is ten feet long, thirty inches in diameter with a drum tail which apparently gives it fair direction. It carries seventy-five percent explosives, has a simple detonator at the nose only, and could be manufactured by anybody. The use of this bomb made me feel that it marked a beginning of retaliatory action.

WINANT

NPL

JR
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

London

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 6:20 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION EIGHT)

One of the early mistakes in workers training was limiting it to those on relief. Later a small stipend was paid during the working period this was also a mistake because it attracted the less able rather than the skilled from non-essential industries to the war industries. I am told that one of the reasons for considerable absenteeism and apparent reluctance to volunteer among women for munitions work was that wages have been lower and working conditions less attractive in such work.

The total decline in attendance at moving picture shows in all of England is only 30%.

The air raid shelters while much improved are still far from satisfactory.

I am asking Sergeant Florence, who did some work for the National Planning Board under Mr. Delano, to report on city planning which is receiving very

considerable

-2- #1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION EIGHT) from London.

considerable attention here. Already in devastated areas people mark out their private property lines. The persistence of private property rights when rebuilding commences will make the straightening of streets a problem. Bevin has also given permission to Florence and his wife to make a study of the labor agencies as they are now functioning under his direction. This is being done.

WINANT

RR

EH
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to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 9:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION NINE).

In order to decrease the consumption of wheat, the government plans to use ten percent of potato flour in bread. It will be done to decrease wheat shipments in order to save tonnage space for other commodities. I also understand that it is likely that the government will take over the transport system within the next three months, and that the buying of clothes will probably be rationed within a very short time. I agreed not to repeat these last three items of information except to you and the Secretary.

NPL

WINANT

JT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

LONDON

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 7:15 a.m., 4th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION TEN)

The above comments on social life I have picked up largely in the course of conversations with informed people in and outside the government. There is no machinery in the Embassy to date to report systematically on such matters. An unusually able man is sadly needed for this purpose. He should be sufficiently footloose to move about.

Before leaving Washington both Green and Murray spoke to me about possibility of having a man attached to the Embassy who could report on labor and social conditions. If you and Secretary Hull felt that such a person could be assigned, I think it would help at home as well as here. Whoever is appointed should be acceptable to both Green and Murray if they are to feel that the labor field is covered. (END MESSAGE)

WINANT

WSB

RS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (sc)

London
May 6, 1941

Rec'd 4:39 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1787, May 6, 9 p.m.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR PRESIDENT.

My number 1753, May 3, midnight.

In reference to the Prime Minister's message which came to the chancery about 1 o'clock Sunday morning, I feel you should know that I talked with the Prime Minister on the telephone early Saturday afternoon, as I planned to be away that night. He had just returned from Plymouth which was badly battered. He seemed both sad and discouraged. We talked about your message (Department's number 1471, May 1, 9 p.m.) and I had the impression that he was troubled about it. I told him it was a supporting message. He rather felt it was a message of delay. I offered to go down to see him but he told me he would not answer you until after we had lunched together on Monday, when we could talk over his reply. He asked me not to report in the meantime on our telephone conversation, further explaining that he wanted to consult with some of his people.

Our rule at the Embassy is to expedite the des(*)

Prime

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

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Safe
Wimant

Boyl.

Wimant

-2-, #1787, from London, dated May 6, 1941; rec'd 4:39 p.m.

Prime Minister or from the Prime Minister to you immediately on receipt. Therefore I did not see this message before it was forwarded to you. Prior to this occasion the Prime Minister has usually discussed with me messages and always public statements bearing on Anglo-American relations.

When I saw him with Eden on Monday, they told me that they were very sorry they had failed to talk over this message with me as had been agreed by the Prime Minister. They told me it would not happen again.

I have hesitated about reporting this to you, but felt I should.

WINANT

GW

(*) omission

Winant

*PSF
Safe
Winant*

Lark box

TEM
This telegraph must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

London
Dated July 31, 1941
Rec'd 6:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3338, July 31, midnight.

PERSONAL AND ~~MOST SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT.

"When I was in Washington I talked with Marshall.
Since returning, I have seen much of Dill. I wish
Marshall could know Dill's mind.

Synchronizing action here with developing
policy at home may be more accurately translated
if we have a returning observer. Ghormley has
been most helpful in keeping me informed.

WINANT

NK

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

Winant

PSF
Safe File
Winant
Luck log

RS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

LONDON
Dated August 1, 1941
Rec'd 6:43 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

3365, August 1, 11 p.m., (SECTION ONE)

~~MOST SECRET~~ TO THE ACTING SECRETARY FOR THE
PRESIDENT.

There will be a problem that will come up short-
ly for discussion. It will have to do with a matter
that Fraser, the Prime Minister of New Zealand
broached with me the other day. The Australians in
particular and the New Zealanders also are disturbed
by the Japanese encroachments. They want very much
to have the British work out with us some arrangement
under which the British and ourselves could join in
recognition of their situation with the object of
furthering their security.

It occurred to me that when this matter was called
to your attention it might permit a reference to India.
I have thought for some time that the charge of im-
perialism against England in the United States largely
focused on the Indian situation. This sentiment hinders
support to Britain.

I remember

-2-, No. 3365 from London, August 1, 1941; 6:43 p.m.

I remember very clearly the effort in the Far East to work out understandings among the Asiatic peoples--China, India and Japan--and that Japan blocked the way.

If we can count on a friendly India with China already as an ally the future problem in the Far East will be in large measure solved as well as bridged to the western world.

WINANT

GW

RS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated August 1, 1941

Rec'd 6:47 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

3365, August 1, 11 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

The British have always emphasized the problem of minorities in India, and the practical difficulties of securing an agreement on a constitution in which protection was given to the minorities and under which a stabilized state could be established. It can be argued that the war period does not permit the time and attention necessary to solve the issue, but it is also true that failing to solve it disturbs large groups both within the British empire and elsewhere in the world and handicaps the support of the war in India itself.

It might be possible at least to get agreement on the right of Dominion status for India so as to eliminate that major issue now, while at the same time giving a further pledge to implement this status within a stated period following the cessation of hostilities.

Among other considerations I believe this action
would

-2-, No. 3365 from London, August 1, 1941; 6:47 p.m.

would have a sobering effect upon the Japanese.

In my opinion a number of the Cabinet would favor such a plan. When the Indian question was up at a Cabinet meeting some time ago the Prime Minister was opposed to taking action. Unless the idea was suggested by you I doubt if this subject would again be pressed for further consideration.

(END OF MESSAGE.)

WINANT

CSB

ALH

Warrant

PLAIN

London

Date d December 27, 1941

Rec'd 12:03 p.m.,

*PSF: Safe File
Warrant*

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6243, Twenty-seventh.

Our 6216, Twenty-fourth.

Following summaries German and Italian press comment Churchill's visit from digest twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth.

DNB Twenty-third states: "Presence Churchill in Washington is of interest to Berlin political circles in that it represents a symptom. Wilhelmstrasse view is that the catastrophic situation in Anglo-American conduct of war has led to this meeting. Leading men of Britain and United States are forced to make decisions of important and far reaching nature to meet this catastrophic situation. Wilhelmstrasse believes Roosevelt will demand certain conditions from Churchill which will deeply affect British life and which will cause clash between British and American interests. It is extremely difficult if not impossible to bring these interests under a common denominator".

TRANSOCEAN twenty-third writes from Berlin:
"Churchill's voyage to Washington is described by

Wilhelmstrasse

-2- # 6243, December 27, from London

Wilhelmstrasse as Premier's 'penance to Canossa' while German press in headlines expressed opinion that Churchill was ordered to Washington by Roosevelt. Wilhelmstrasse adds that Germany is little interested in outcome of Washington conference."

Stefani twenty-third declares that Churchill's journey to Washington means another step by England along path of political submission to United States. Last time the two statesmen met halfway but now Churchill has gone far as White House and this has occasioned much comment. There are two hypotheses: either Churchill is in such urgent need of North American aid that he has gone to ask for it personally so as to secure absolute priority or else London has feeling Roosevelt needs advice on his first steps in the War, which actually have not been brilliant.

Noting that Litvinov is attending Washington conferences, Stefani twenty-fourth continues "He is the most cunning of the three and will easily be able to do what he likes with other two and will put interests of Bolshevism above **everything**. Litvinov is in strong position in Washington these days, in view of fact that for months only Front on which plutocracies were fighting was, by supreme irony, The Russian Front.

Russian

-3- #6243, December 27, from London

Russian soldiers have shown themselves to be in practice the best soldiers of capitalism.

"Lord Beaverbrook's presence White House conversations strengthens hypothesis that American inclination to suspend for some time application Lend-Lease law is absolutely unacceptable to England, who took rash decision to use enormous quantity war material in Libya without thought of any economy, on the assurance this war material would be replaced for General Auchinlek quickly as possible by American industry."

STAMPA twenty-fourth declares that Churchill, the vassal of President Roosevelt, is consulting his master to determine with him whether it is preferable to strip Atlantic and Mediterranean in order to attempt resistance in Pacific or **whether Anglo-Saxon powers** must resign themselves to defeat in Asia.

POPOLO DI ROMA twenty-fourth notes satisfaction expressed by British press and radio over prospects that Washington conference will lead to unified democratic command and adds "They are under the illusion that such a command would be entrusted to London." Apart from this question which does not interest Axis, the paper continues, conference has no other task than that of drawing up balance sheet of disasters suffered

by the

-4- #6243, December 27, from London

by the democracies in the War which they instigated in Pacific and which has led Britain and America to assume a defensive position as desperate as it is sterile.

WINANT

ALC

4/Boot

Safe: Winant

NWN

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London,

Dated February 17, 1942

Rec'd. 11:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

735, February 17, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT

At the request of Secretary Hull I cabled a brief estimate of the political situation here this morning. ^{*} I wanted you also to know that I thought the Prime Minister was tired. Some of the political criticism is justified but much of it is small and petty and simply takes his time and wastes his energy. A cheery word from you and Harry always lightens his load.

WINANT

HPD

** will be forwarded as soon as received and decoded.*

Safe: Winant Folder

June 17, 1942.

Dear Gil:-

I have not had a chance in the past week to thank you for yours of June third. Molotov's visit here was a real success and he actually got chummy toward the end. You certainly managed to work out that British-Russian Treaty in thoroughly acceptable form, and I think Molotov understood, after being here a few days, that if he had pressed the original it would have caused almost irreparable damage to the ideals of the war.

The Second Front is still a thorny problem to crack, but I am pushing for some more definite action.

I have had two or three good talks with Lyttelton -- and I like him much. I think he agrees with me that the situation in Lybia is by no means rosy. I would be satisfied with a drawn battle at this time.

In case of a certain visit, I am telegraphing to Winston expressing the hope that Portal will come with him.

I think you are right in not joining the Pacific Council in London. I have an idea that that Council is at this time a fifth wheel. My own Pacific Council serves primarily to disseminate information as to the progress of

operations in the Pacific -- and, secondly, to
give me a chance to keep everybody happy by
telling stories and doing most of the talking!


Thank you much for the photographs.

My best wishes to you,

As ever yours,

Honorable John G. Winant,
American Embassy,
London,
England.

*Photos sent to Elliott
with little note - in family file*



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

London, June 3rd, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

Since I saw you in Washington, I have been spending most of my time working on two problems: one; the Russian Treaty, and, two: the Second Front. There have been other collateral problems, but I have thought they were of secondary importance; and there is the usual routine work of the Embassy.

I believe that before the Russians reached England, I had convinced the key men here of your very real opposition to a Frontier Treaty. Both the Prime Minister and Eden did their best to persuade Molotoff of that fact, but I think you should also know that it was not until I had talked with Molotoff and personally stated to him your objections, that he abandoned his position on frontiers and agreed to recommend to Stalin the draft Treaty which I had worked on with Eden, and which, with minor changes suggested by the Russians, was accepted and signed.

Due to General Marshall's and Harry's mission here, there was a lively interest in the Second Front by responsible people when I first returned. There was also a popular demand for action, to aid Russia. Although orderly planning for invasion has continued, I have felt that there has been a dropping off of sustained interest by ranking people, so far as 1942 is concerned. The public, at the same time, has appeared to resent an effort on the part of some politicians to criticise the Administration, while identifying themselves with the Second Front movement.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C..

I believe the general concensus of opinion is to accept the leadership of the Government and support it, believing that if an invasion of the Continent is possible, it will be undertaken.

The visit of General Arnold and General Somervell, with others, has again centred interest on this subject, and has increased active consideration of the problem. It is my opinion, however, that action and success will depend on what General Somervell described to me as a "sustained excitement" on the part of the Prime Minister and the higher British military officers. It will take great determination and singleness of purpose to organize an invasion force large enough to divert German ground forces from the Eastern Front, or to occupy the mainland in sufficient depth to be in a position to compel a major diversion of the German Air Force from the Eastern to the Western Front. I believe a great deal more could be done than is now being done, but only with your personal intervention and vigorous support. I liked your message of June first to the Prime Minister. I felt the lift of it, as I am sure he did. At the same time, I thought your estimate of the Russian situation made it clear that it was of concern to us and called for action on our part.

I wired you this evening, asking for information as to the position you had taken in relation to the Russian demand for a Second Front, as I felt it would help me in working out your wishes with the British.

I have seen something of General De Gaulle lately, partly because Eden felt that I could help keep him in line, and also because I respect him as a fighting man. The Prime Minister this last week has had a more friendly attitude toward him, because of the gallant behaviour of the Free French unit fighting in Lybia. He asked Tommy Thompson to put on all his gold braid and deliver a message of congratulations to De Gaulle, because of the effective part they have played in the desert battle. I spent three hours with De Gaulle and with Eden, convincing De Gaulle of the stupidity of his press conference which appeared last week, and explained to him that to be friendly one minute and critical the next was not good enough. He told me he understood. Eden said afterwards that he had
never/

never seen him as reasonable or as friendly; but he may not stay put. It is De Gaulle's opinion that an invasion of France is necessary if we are to hold the French people, and that even if it resulted in another Dunkirk, it would be worth the effort. He is fearful that a failure to attempt an invasion will depress the French and increase German control in France.

I hope that you will have an opportunity to get Lyttelton's opinion on the independent elections, and also Averell's. Their opinions differ, but I feel that they could each throw some light on the general situation here. A victory in Lybia would, in my opinion, put the Prime Minister in a very strong position both in Parliament and in the country. At the moment, the British have prevented the Germans from carrying out their planned campaign, but Rommel is still strong, and both sides have suffered heavy casualties. The six-pounders have been effective, and Auchinleck has reported very favorably on the Grant tank. The Germans' initiating the attack allowed the English to get the slow infantry tank into early action in the engagement. The reports also show that the English concentrated their artillery fire against the enemy tanks, and used their own tanks against weaker objectives to a larger extent than in any previous engagement. A success in this campaign should particularly influence neutral opinion in Turkey and the Mediterranean, as well as general opinion elsewhere.

You undoubtedly know that Portal is the only Chief of Staff officer whom we can count on for the present to support an early '42 attack. Again reverting to this problem, I believe a Supreme Commander of all the services is necessary to ensure success, and the only man I can think of who is outstanding, to carry forward this project, is General Marshall. You might not be able to spare him, and the British would be reluctant to accept him, with Brooke against, Pound neutral, and Portal supporting.

The other day, I cabled you that I had been asked by all factions if I would sit in with the Pacific Council. I wired back that I thought this
would/

would be a mistake. In the first place, it would be an effort to equalize representation in London and Washington; in the second place, I know little about the Pacific area and am far away from it; and in the third place, it would divide my influence in the area to which you have assigned me. I would like to be single-purposed in supporting a Western Front operation. If it is decided to build up a supporting war council or other agency for such an operation in London, I would like to serve on it, as I believe I could be of real assistance in carrying out a policy which you might lay down.

The other day, Mr. Devereux, who was connected with aircraft production, gave me the three enclosed snapshots. Two of them are of Doolittle and Royce, and the third is a very attractive picture of Elliott. I thought you might like them.

I always think of you, and miss seeing you very much. I hope we are getting done the things you want done here.

Please remember me to Harry.

With every good wish for yourself,

Sincerely,

John Gilbert W. W. W.

Safe: Winant
Prot

BAS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated July 15, 1942

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

3908, July 15, 2 p.m.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT

Maisky just came in to see me. He told me he had had a conference with the Prime Minister and Admiral Pound last night. Pound explained to him the losses suffered by the northern convoy and said he was opposed to continuing shipments over the northern route to Russia at this time. Maisky said he objected vigorously to this decision and was told by the Prime Minister and Pound that since many of our ships were involved the final decision would rest with us.

Maisky further told me that both he and his naval adviser do not feel that the last convoy was adequately protected or skillfully handled. Maisky was critical of Pound as an aggressive naval officer.

Maisky stated that he felt, at this time when Russia was under the greatest pressure and no apparent effort was being made here to establish a second

front

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 7 1972
By J. Schauble Date _____

-2- #3908, July 15, 2 p.m. from London

front in time, that to discontinue the northern supply line would not be understood by his country and would be a serious mistake.

I have reported Maisky's conversation as accurately as I have been able to record it immediately after his leaving the room. I felt that it should be forwarded to you at once without further checking by me because of other messages which have been cabled to you by the Prime Minister and because of Maisky's statement to me that the Prime Minister and Pound told him that the final decision on the continuance or discontinuance of the convoys would be made by us.

WINANT

NPL

Safe: Winant
Bar

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Winant

July 17, 1942

Dorothy:

This can be filed.

Lois

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dec. 29, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. H.

Will you read this over and
I will talk with you about it later?

F. D. R.

AF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 5:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m., (SECTION ONE)

~~MOST SECRET~~ TO THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER
SECRETARY.

At my request Lord Swinton furnished me with a memorandum on the (*)ity Executive of the British Government. I thought you might find it useful to have this at once and I am telegraphing the text herewith. In his covering letter, Lord Swinton, the head of the Executive, explains he has endeavored in the memorandum to anticipate the type of questions the American Government authorities might wish to ask and that he has tried to show what are the relations of the Executive with a variety of Government Departments and why it works as smoothly as it does. He mentions further that the spirit of approach is more than half the battle and that today all the Departments look upon the Executive not merely as a coordinator but as a helpful partner to which they gladly bring their problems. He continues that the

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Scheuble Date FEB 8 1972

secret

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from
London.

secret of this ~~is~~ **not** in attempting to create new sections of one's own to do other peoples' work but to face up to problems, obtain the right solution and action required, assign the responsibility for action, and assist the Departments themselves to carry out that action.

Lord Swinton emphasizes that the Executive and its work are highly secret. Its existence was announced by the Prime Minister in the House, but he made it plain that no further information could be given about it. A prohibition has been placed upon the press from referring to any of its activities. Lord Swinton mentions that the memorandum is as full an account of the Executive and its operation as would be given to his own Ministers and he stresses that it would be very embarrassing to him and his work if anything were published in the United States which would not be allowed here. He expresses the hope that it will not be necessary to multiply copies of the memorandum in the United States.

I earnestly request that his wishes in the above regard will be respected.

The memorandum follows:

WINANT

(*) Apparent omission
ALC

AF
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

BEGIN MEMORANDUM:

The object of this paper is to show why the
Security Executive was created the field it covers
and how it works.

Definition of "Security".

By "Security" is meant the defense of national
interests against hostile elements other than the
armed forces of the enemy; in practice, against
espionage, sabotage and attempts to procure defeat
by subversive political activity. "Security" in this
sense is not confined to the United Kingdom. It ex-
tends to British Colonies: to the Dominions and
India with whom liaison is maintained: and it covers
such British interests abroad as the security of
British ships and cargoes in foreign ports.

Authorities responsible.

In Great Britain the authorities mainly respon-
sible for security in this sense and the Home Office
(and under their general direction the police forces)

the War

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION TWO) from
London.

the War Office and the Commander in Chief Home Forces. Many other Departments and services, however, have security functions within their own sphere. The Service Departments are responsible for the security of the fighting services, their establishments and communications; the Production Departments for the security of factories and industrial plant; the Ministry of War Transport for the security of land and sea transport services. Other Departments actively assist those primarily responsible: Postal and Telegraph Censorship performs important security functions in the interception of communications and that Customs and Excise take part in security control at ports. Security in British Colonies is in the hands of the Colonial Governments reinforced in war by officers of the Security Service under the general direction of the Colonial Office. The Foreign Office together with the overseas representatives of the Admiralty and the Ministry of War Transport are concerned in the security of British interests abroad, especially British shipping in overseas ports. The Security Service is responsible for advising all these Departments on security measures and supplying them with relevant 'intelligence'.

WINANT

EDA

AF

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London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 9:58 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

the Security Executive.

With so many different authorities and so wide a range of activities there was danger of duplication and hiatus. To avoid this, the Security Executive was set up by the Prime Minister and was charged with the duty of coordinating all security activities, preventing overlapping and omissions affording opportunity for the sharing of experience and maintaining a proper balance between security and other national interests.

The Chairman of the Security Executive is responsible to the Prime Minister, and in the field of unified security to the Lord President of the Council who acts for the Prime Minister in this sphere. The Chairman of the Executive happens also to be the executive head of the Security Service; this, although convenient is not essential to his functions.

Membership of the Executive.

The Chairman

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION THREE) from
London.

The Chairman is assisted by two independent members without departmental association or responsibilities, and by representatives of the Prime Minister and the Lord President of the Council. He holds regular meetings at which the great majority of the Departments enumerated above are continuously represented, together with those concerned with intelligence, including the intelligence directorates of the three fighting services. While the departments with general security or intelligence functions are always represented at each meeting, those with purely sectional interests attend only for the discussions which concern them. For special purposes representatives may be invited from any Department.

WINANT

WSB

EH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 10:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION FOUR).

Method of the Executive.

The title "Security Executive" is somewhat mislead-
ing to an outsider, as the Executive is a coordinating
body and does not itself take the operative action to
give effect to its recommendations. It is the function
of the Executive to see that security problems are
properly envisaged, that the best practical measures
are framed to meet them and that responsibility for
action is assigned to the appropriate departments.
It keeps in close touch with all departments to follow
up action and to see that recommendations are working
out satisfactorily in practice. At any moment problems
and action are reviewed. But the Executive has set
itself resolutely against doing the work of other depart-
ments. If a department needs strengthening or expanding
to undertake some new duty, the Executive makes the
necessary recommendations and gives the department all
the help it can; but the Executive does not supplant

the

-2-#6234, (SEC. FOUR) from London. December 27, 7 a.m.

the department or try to do its job for it. This is one of the chief reasons why it works smoothly. Departmental jealousies are avoided; and the sound principle is followed that you do not get two bodies trying to do the same job, but assign the task to the right body and see that it is equipped to do it properly. In this way departments have come to look on the Executive not merely as a coordinator, still less as a rival, but I hope as a helpful partner to whom they readily bring their problems and their troubles.

The method of the Executive has been largely determined by the fact that it did not create the security system of Great Britain but found a large number of security problems needing urgent solution. In the early stages it was necessary for the chairman himself to bring forward subjects for consideration in order to ensure that no part of the field was overlooked. But as the usefulness of the machinery afforded by the Executive became apparent, the constituent departments have themselves tended more and more to raise of their own accord any problem in which a new question of principle is involved or which calls for cooperation with other departments. As a rule representatives are able to come

to

-3-#6234 (SECTION FOUR) from London. December 27, 7 a.m.

to meetings prepared to commit their departments so that action can be taken forthwith without reference back. The conclusions of the Executive are expressed in the form of recommendations for action by the department concerned. Usually these are readily carried out. If, as very rarely happens, a minister disagrees with a recommendation, he may refer it to the Prime Minister or to the Lord President.

WIMANT

WNC

BS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd. 10:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION FIVE)

Staff of the Executive: special conference.

The Executive is served by a small full time staff of civil servants headed as chief officer by the recently retired head of an important Department of State. It is their duty to keep the Executive informed of all questions arising for consideration and to issue the necessary memoranda, agenda, minutes and reports. (these are kept as brief as possible consistently with clarity and are formulated in confidence each copy being serially numbered and registered to the recipient). They arrange special conferences to consider questions which are not of sufficient importance to bring before the Executive or on which preliminary work is necessary and run committees appointed by the Executive to work out the detailed application of agreed policies or to take charge of questions requiring continuous and detailed oversight. It is the function of this staff to follow

up the

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from London

up the Executive's recommendations to see that they are carried out and that they prove workable in practice.

Liaison officers.

The Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, Home Office, G H Q (Home forces) Ministry of Information, Postal and Telegraphic Censorship, Secret Intelligence Service, Security Service and Metropolitan Police have regular liaison officers attached to the staff by the Executive. In this way daily contact is maintained between the Security, Executive and these departments. This has many advantages. Security Intelligence coming from any source at home or abroad is pooled and the liaison officer insures that such information at once reaches the branch of his ministry most directly concerned. Prompt consultation can take place between the chairman or his chief officer and several departments;

WINANT

LWC

BAS

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London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 11:23 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION SIX)

and action can be rapidly agreed and taken. The liaison officers also meet regularly under the chairmanship of the chief officer. This affords a means of pooling detailed information and disposing shortly of minor matters which would often otherwise waste considerable time in correspondence between departments. It is particularly successful in dealing with false reports and ill-founded suspicions or proposals which in security and intelligence matters are continually reaching the authorities from official and unofficial quarters.

Principles on which the Executive works.

In this way the Executive has covered in the eighteen months of its operation every aspect of security in Great Britain and many questions of security overseas. In so doing it has aimed at assessing the true importance of each apprehended danger and at maintaining a just balance between

security

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 p.m. (SECTION SIX) from
London

security and other vital interests. To achieve this and to see the various risks and competing interest in their true perspective requires a detached and central viewpoint which can seldom be attained by departments in isolation with their own special interests paramount. At the Executive, however, after hearing each other's point of view departments can frequently agree that a risk has been overrated or that some restriction is purchasing security by hindering war production or essential transport services; or conversely that the needs of security compel precautions or restrictions the inconvenience or disadvantage of which must be accepted in the national interest.

WINANT

ALC

ES

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London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd. 12:32 a.m., 28th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION SEVEN)

In addition to such specific problems the Executive has inevitably been concerned with general questions of organization. Here the policy of coordination has been carried right down to the subordinate officials of the departments concerned throughout the country providing all with general guidance, linking the police forces with the regional organization of the security service and with the local commands of the fighting forces and arranging for the widest possible distribution within each service of information on the activities of the others. The assignment of departmental responsibilities has led naturally to the delimitation of the functions of their respective officials so that in each locality the representatives of the various authorities may work together as a team.

Scope of the Executive's work.

The scope of the Executive's work may best be illustrated by the attached list of subjects which

have been

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN) from London

have been dealt with by the Executive itself, one of its committees or the liaison officers' conference. It may be useful, however, to give some typical examples in greater detail as follows.

A port security. Questions affecting port security have covered a wide range, e.g. security of docks and ships, conditions affecting British, allied and neutral seamen, the examination of passengers outgoing and incoming including refugees censorship of documents on passengers and ships, maintaining the secrecy of ships' destinations and other important information. A number of departments are involved: Admiralty, War Office, Ministry of War Transport, port authorities, Ministry of Labor, Home Office immigration and customs offices, censorship, security, service and local police forces. In facing the many problems an attempt is made to reconcile the needs of security with the practical working of the port.

WINANT

KLP

BAS
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to anyone. (B)

London
Dated December 27, 1941
Rec'd 2 a.m.; 28th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION EIGHT)

(B) Alien's policy. The initial policy (in which the Executive had no part) was to impose on enemy aliens restrictions graduated according to their estimated potential danger. In the period of extreme emergency, however, after Dunkirk with invasion an immediate possibility, the Executive advised a policy of general internment always with the intention that the internees should be sifted on their individual merits in accordance with principles yet to be devised. These principles were worked out in consultation with the Executive and became the "categories of release" under which the great majority of the internees were released, some unconditionally, some subject to restrictions. As the danger has become less immediate, it has been possible to adopt a more liberal policy based on principles carefully worked out in the light of accumulated intelligence.

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION EIGHT)

from London

intelligence. In this way, the liberty of the subject has been reconciled with the security of the state.

(C) Subversive activities. It is the duty of the Executive to watch through the various investigating departments the activities of all movements which are or may be subversive and to recommend whatever action maybe necessary from time to time. Thus the Executive has recommended action against the British Union of Fascists and the proscription of the organization. The activities of the Communist party of Great Britain have been closely watched and their effect on public opinion carefully estimated. Official action has been recommended from time to time and the Executive has been able to expose the penetration of the party into many apparently reputable organizations and in particular its attempts to undermine the authority of trade unions. Pacifist organizations have been similarly watched though it has not been necessary to recommend any special action.

WINANT

NK

BAS
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to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 5:20 a.m.; 28th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION NINE)

(D). Anti Sabotage. To the existing general anti-sabotage measures the Executive was able to apply intelligence indicating that the enemy seemed likely to undertake a particular type of sabotage.

Special precautions were therefore concentrated on the points most vulnerable to this form of attack and on the sources from which material for the attack seemed most likely to be drawn.

(E). Control of Entry. The Executive arranged facilities for the examination at a central point of all refugees and other aliens arriving in Great Britain whose entry had not been authorized beforehand. The reception center at which these people are interrogated has been administered under the guidance of a committee of the departments concerned under the Executive; they have been able to provide for essential security and intelligence interests and to obtain a large measure of cooperation from the

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from
London.

from the allied Governments at present in Great Britain.

(F). Colonial Security. The existing security system in British colonies in West Africa and the Caribbean has been specially reviewed by the Executive with the Colonial Office and other departments concerned. Experience gained in Great Britain has been adapted to the particular needs of each locality and where necessary reinforcement of the existing security organization has been effected either by sending out the necessary personnel from Great Britain or by appointing suitably qualified officers from the local British community.

WINANT

REP

BAS
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London
Dated December 27, 1941
Rec'd 7:05 a.m.; 28th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION TEN)

(G) Security in South America. In consultation with British Security Coordination in New York a special mission was sent to South America and was successful in establishing in each important port there a local security organization consisting of a security officer experienced in shipping practice and bureaus and a committee composed partly of the British officials on the spot and partly of prominent British residents. The officers were carefully briefed in their new duties and have been able to effect considerable improvements to security in their own localities.

List of subjects covered by security is not complete.

One. Espionage.

Arrangements with police and military commands for dealing with suspected enemy agents.

Facilities for interrogation and detention
conspirers

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION TEN) from
London

conspirers guidance to police on technique of enemy
agents.

Two. Sabotage.

Preventive measures general and special.

Control of firearms, explosives and chemicals.

Arrangements for coordinated investigation and
regular reports.

Three. Subversive Activities.

The British union of Fascists.

The Communist Party of Great Britain and
satellite organizations.

Trotskyist organizations.

Pacifist "religious" and conscientious objectors
organizations.

Four. Other Fifth Column Activities.

Precautions against bogus notices pamphlets
messages requisites.

Control of uniforms badges emblems requisites.

Action against the spreading of malicious or
defeatist rumors.

Watch on enemy broadcasts masquerading as
British.

Five. Aliens.

Policy

-3- #6234, December 27; 7 a.m. (SECTION TEN) from London

Policy of internment and release.

Police and Johnstone registration.

Restrictions on movement employment et cetera.

Privileges for allied nationals.

Safeguarding employment of prisoners of war.

Registration of the recently naturalized.

WINANT

RR

BS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd. 10:20 p.m., 28th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION ELEVEN)

Six. CONTROL OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
CENSORSHIP: Press, postal and telegraph,

travelers.

Special censorship of mail from internment camps and protected areas: between Great Britain and Ireland: of documents carried by ships' crews.

Control of cameras, binoculars, telescopes, radio equipment and high frequency electrical apparatus.

Control of codes, secret inks, light and flag signals, pigeons, et cetera.

Propaganda against careless talk.

Special control of information about the location and activities of factories, Government departments, military establishments, (?) movements of population, port facilities, air raid damage. Special control of information obtainable from government departments, government contractors, labor recruiting agents,

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION ELEVEN) from London

agents, fire insurance proposal forms and the published accounts and reports of companies, public utilities, local authorities, et cetera.

Seven. IDENTITY CARDS, PASSES AND PERMITS

Value of identity cards for security purposes.

Production of identity cards at hotels and boarding houses.

Special identity cards for seamen and other special classes.

Eight. SECURITY OF SPECIAL LOCALITIES

Security measures in (*):

Operational or training areas.

Government and service establishments, aerodromes, internment camp.

Factories, depots, public utilities, et cetera.

Ports, docks (?) yards.

Nine. CONTROL OF ENTRY EXIT, TRAVEL FACILITIES

Issue of visas: examination of arrivals.

Exit permits: repatriation policy.

Port control: coordination always in port security services.

Control of air and steamship lines.

Ten. SHIPPING SECURITY

Prevention of subversion of crews.

Special

-3- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION ELEVEN) from London

Special measures to control information regarding convoys.

Special anti-sabotage precautions make this.

Eleven. OVERSEAS SECURITY.

Security measures in and for:

British colonies (West Africa and West Indies)

British Central Africa Dominions.

British interests overseas.

(END MEMORANDUM)

(END OF MESSAGE)

WINANT

WWC

(*) Apparent omission